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China is emerging as the premier economic partner to the Global South. Through
the ability to loan large amounts of hard currency, supply inexpensive industrial and
consumer products, and diversify their economic interests, China plays a key role in the
new global marketplace. The Chinese system of investment diversification forms the
foundation of their commercial diplomacy. One advantage China enjoys is a general lack
of proselytization on issues such as good-governance and environmental safety standards.
This makes for more lucrative business partnerships with many states increasingly
dissatisfied with the burdens of “over regulation.” As China extends its reach into
commercial and strategic raw material industries, it creates more reliable supply lines for
its own industrial revolution. The Chinese system of economic growth and political
outreach has been developed by government ministries working in concert with private
businesses partially directed by the wider foreign policy goals of the state. This paper
discusses the Nigerian petroleum sector, particularly in regard to the constructive market
impact of Chinese assistance and expansion. Further expansion and increasing investment
by Chinese companies into strategic and commercial minerals has led to the growth of
extensive partnerships in Central Africa. Nigeria is the largest most developed economic
power in Africa with a vast consumer market and rich in mineral wealth. Due to these
factors it makes that country a prime example of the power of long term investment. As
time goes on, those raw materials and the associated industries currently being developed
will represent a larger controlling share of the market. The components and mechanisms
fueling our current technological revolution depend on those industries and will continue
to do so for the foreseeable future. Africa’s resource rich landscape will be the ultimate
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proving ground of China’s ability to use commercial diplomacy to acquire a large share
of strategic resources.

1) Introduction
From colonial possessions to developed but still deeply frail states, many of the
countries in Central Africa have tried to use outside investment to expand their
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economies and grow their internal infrastructure.1 The recent surge of Chinese investment
across the African continent has taken many forms, including loans, foreign direct
investment, and technical assistance. The scale and generosity of these programs has
created a strong series of bilateral relationships as well as the expansion into untapped
strategic and commercial raw materials.
Consider, for example, the case of Nigeria and its massive oil reserves. Chinese
development of the Nigerian petroleum sector has acted as a springboard to further
investments in the most populous country and the largest economy on the African
continent. Chinese investment across other major economic sectors has the distinct effect
of making Nigeria into a model of contemporary Chinese economic relations.2 This, in
turn, has led to industrial development and assistance; becoming the cornerstone of wider
diplomatic forays into regions never before valued by Beijing.3
I argue that the size and scope of Chinese financial assistance on the African
continent is part of a well-focused plan to exert strategic influence over expanding and
emerging markets, and increase China’s share of the global marketplace. This form of
commercial diplomacy expands the “Chinese brand,” opening new roads for the growth
of capital and resource dominance in the region.4
1 Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade,
investment, and aid links." The World Bank Research Observer 22.1 (2007): Pg. 122.

2 Ikpefan, Ochei Ailemen. "Challenges of Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Financing in Nigeria."
The Nigerian Accounting Horizon, University of Jos 4.1: (2008): Pg. 61.

3 Freeman, Charles, and Xiaoqing Lu Boynton. "China’s Emerging Global Health and Foreign Aid
Engagement in Africa." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011)

4 Insaidoo, Kwame A. “CHINA: the New Imperialists & Neo-Colonialists in Africa?”. AuthorHouse, (2016):
Pg. 14
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Through large scale loans and investing in resource extracting industries, Chinese
corporations and government-run companies are able to exert powerful influence on the
development of African petroleum as well as a number of other finite strategic resources.
This process, coupled with the diplomatic overtures led by Beijing to the governments of
much of Central Africa combine into what I call “Chinese Commercial Diplomacy.” The
ability to muster large development loans and technical expertise to work on a variety of
economic development projects has led the way to making Chinese assistance very
beneficial for those countries dependent on developing their natural resources. The ability
to access oil and maintain its secure flow to larger developed countries gives those in
control of the pipelines more power and influence over the market. As China grows its
economic stake in Nigeria, they also increase their percentage of ownership of one of the
largest under-tapped oil reserves in the world. This will cause China to achieve greater
energy independence.
My methodology relies on the use of reports assessing and comparing the size and
scope of Chinese financial and technical assistance across Nigeria’s petroleum sector.
This is a case study for similar projects across the continent. This region and economic
sector were chosen due to their central location in the established and still emerging
economic transition to modern production methods and development. I evaluate the
success of China’s commercial diplomacy by examining Chinese investment in--and
indeed the expansion of--the Nigerian petroleum sector. Furthermore, the growth and
scope of Chinese investment in Central Africa’s major mining sectors will track the
drastic upward slope in overall capital investment and mineral diversification. The
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measurement of the overall positive commercial impact of this type of investment can be
seen through the growing economic influence and market expansion, year by year, by
Chinese companies, and their growing share of expanding and emerging markets relative
to the decreasing domestic control of those markets.
The primary goal of this research is to understand the Chinese approach to
bilateral industrial investment and to show that China’s investment is increasing their
control and access to key strategic oil reserves necessary to ensure their continued
economic development. In 2004 China began investing in a wide variety of African
commercial ventures and resource development. Within five years they were the largest
trading partner to the whole continent. This trend is interesting given China’s history of
relatively isolationist policies.5 The branching out for resources access is not a new
occurrence. However, the size and scope of Chinese intervention in Nigerian, and wider
African petroleum production, shows the extreme importance of creating a safe reliable
source of energy to fuel future economic ambitions.

5 Pozzebon, Stefano. “China has crossed a major investment threshold that is going to change the entire
world.” Business Insider, (2015)
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2) Literature Review
This chapter reviews the work on Nigerian-Chinese economic partnership, the
development of the wider relationship between the two, and its effect on their shared
commodity industries. The main goal of reviewing this research is to utilize the vast work
already conducted on the subject matter to build a new explanation. . I discuss the various
methods and aims of Chinese economic diplomacy in Nigeria, and those business
practices aimed toward the expansion of influence and control over key strategic
resources--in this case oil. The sources chronicle the numerous reasons and methods
behind the building of closer political and trade relationships by China throughout Africa.
The three main areas of background research are: 1) Chinese Economic
Diplomacy; 2) Nigeria‘s petroleum industry and the role played by China; 3) Nigerian
and Chinese trade relations

a) Chinese Economic Diplomacy
The need to participate and influence global markets, particularly with regard to
strategic and energy resources, is crucial for any emerging world power. As China grows
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its global brand it requires new partnerships and a steady access to the resources
necessary for growth. The concept of Chinese Economic Diplomacy acts as a road map to
navigate those relationships and act in concert with the needs of Beijing. Central Africa
has proved to be an optimal testing ground for those policies. There is a wide array of
resources on this subject covering a variety of angles. Some of the research focused on
economic development, while others focused on human rights and the impact on the
environment. It was important to find impartial sources which discussed these ideas free
from ideological constraints.
According to Nabine the fundamental objective of his research is to ascertain the
impact of Nigerian exports/imports and Chinese FDI on Nigerian economic
development.6 The paper also provided background on how economic growth responds to
offset some of the wider regional trade imbalances. Nabine regards the connection
between Chinese trade and the Nigerian economy as linked inevitably to the much
ignored contribution of the Chinese FDI as the main indicator of expanded influence. On
the topic of overall trade imbalance and the increased Chinese influence over the energy
industry, Nabine left too many questions unanswered and instead tended to focus solely
on the overall role Chinese FDI has played in the bilateral trade partnership. This was
helpful to set a big picture of how investment structures work, but required a combination
of other research to properly fill in the blanks in the overall assessment.
Ikejiaku applies liberal economic theories on dependency to explain the African
debt crisis and the roots of mistrust and caution that many African governments have for
Western sources of investment; particularly the IMF and the World Bank. This was
6 Nabine, D. "The impact of Chinese investment and trade on Nigeria economic growth." ATPC Work in
progress 77 (2009)
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helpful in establishing some systemic reasons for the preference of Chinese FDI and the
impact of decades of imposed fines, loans, and market corrections on Central Africa over
the past 40 years. Ikejiku concludes that while the Nigerian government is in some ways
to blame for their situation, the missteps by the international community and Western
investment practices were the primary cause of economic hardship. This paper wasn’t
particularly objective to the possibilities of new coercive predatory lending, and left an
objective gap in the impact played by domestic Nigerian corruption.7 The themes were
still useful in understanding the reluctance of many African economies to adopt one set of
standards in a trading partner, but willingness to embrace another. While, from the
perspective of Lengauer, the ability of non-aligned and emerging economic powers, such
as the BRICS, to become “sponsors” and donor countries allows them the freedom to
pursue their own economic needs free of the influence of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This has given Beijing opportunities to follow
their main “foreign policy priority”, namely the expansion of the Chinese economy and
its influence over an increasing share of the global marketplace. Lengauer further argues
that the inherent unreliability of Chinese sources for energy have spurred the main thrust
of this economic diplomacy while countries like the United States have been trying to
focus on mainly increasing domestic energy production while decreasing energy
consumption.8 Her use of white papers, statistics, and policy initiatives by the Ministries

7 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: towards Theoretical
explanations." Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 4 (2008)
8 Lengauer, Sara. "China's foreign aid policy: Motive and method," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the
Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 3. (2011)
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of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Financial Affairs, helped to build the case for a top
down trade policy with ambitions and goals far surpassing solely economic interests.

b) Nigeria‘s petroleum industry and the role played by China
Alden and Alves analyze Chinese growing interaction with the mineral sector and
on Nigerian energy production. Now as the largest petroleum consumer and third largest
petroleum importer, China has, based on the analysis, has created a framework to gain
access to new sources of strategic minerals. Alden views the Chinese system in the scope
of the “Angola mode” which exchanges development money and FDI for raw resources
and certain controls on overall production and mining of those resources. While the focus
tends to stray away from the importance of oil imports in favor of looking at the overall
mineral mining sector the structure of a grand strategy to secure and expand control vital
African resources emerges in the narrative. This piece was particularly useful in its
analysis of different types of applications of the same Chinese concepts in the use of FDI.
The report does leave unanswered questions as to the governing forces behind those
moves, but that is what this research paper is attempting to discuss and evaluate.9
Whitfield’s book offers an approach to understanding the relationship between aid
donors and recipient African governments. While official statements stress that form
forms of aid do not come with the same external baggage as in the past, the author shows
that manty Western versions of FDI and loaning governments have merely repackaged
old forms of control to new trade deals. Much of the information Whitfield collects is in
9 Alden, Chris, and Ana Cristina Alves. “China and Africa's natural resources: The challenges and
implications for development and governance.” Johannesburg: South African Institute of International
Affairs, (2009)
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the form of interviews done with those involved in the aid acquisition process from both
ends of the spectrum. There is a stressed look at the redefinition of terms such as
“ownership” and “oversight” which have been seen as attempts to repackage old mistakes
as new initiatives. This mistrust caused by the African financial crises over the past
decades have led to the embracing of less hands on approaches by Chinese FDI and
African tactics to approach aid from a more practical standpoint. Her conclusions about
the changing nature of African governments in relation to their bilateral trade and aid
acquisition helped this paper frame both the need and the shape that modern aid
relationships are being built in the region.10 This also touched on concepts about the effect
of FDI on African business and social culture. While outside of the scope of this
particular paper, that topic would be a fascinating follow-up.

c) Nigerian and Chinese trade relations
Hess and Aidoo examine the beginning of the pattern of non-interference with
trading partners as a pillar of Chinese foreign policy. While publically the promotion of
noninterference as the standard in negotiated trade partnerships, since the economic
reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the utilitarian needs of increased raw materials and energy
sources have cause the policy to evolve. Hess’ take is that China no longer feels the need
to stand by an outdated more revolutionary ideological model and that more can be
achieved by backdoor policy positioning than had been in the past. The authors conclude
that the practice in conjunction with increasing trade and influence is becoming
unrealistic and that new tactics and steps have been designed to promote noninterference
10 Whitfield, Lindsay. “The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors: African Strategies for
Dealing with Donors.” Oxford University Press, (2008)
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publically (to promote pro-Chinese sentiments and counteract accusations of coercion
and corruption) while taking a more prominent position in the future of Chinese interests
passing current levels of economic and commercial partnership. These methods gave a
more evolutionary perspective to the policy priorities and nature of political process
taking hold in the past decade.11 This helped form the idea for looking at the wider scope
of how these policy priorities develop and the overlap between private enterprise and
government direction.
Lum took a statistically critical look at the increase in Chinese aid from year to
year and region to region over the five year period of 2002 to 2007. The look at this as a
metric to extrapolate the influence of China’s soft power has been a helpful tool in
understanding the wider use of development money to create access to new markets and
expand old ones. The author also defines the differences between development dollars
and the overall regional strategies implemented by the foreign ministry in Beijing. These
conclusions include the idea that China’s main goals in Africa and South America are
more in line with their short term economic development plans, while recent forays into
East and South Asia represent a Chinese long term diplomatic strategy aimed at
becoming the main leader in the region both strategically and economically. Throughout
this report and in many of the other pieces analyzed there continues the overall theme of a
multifaceted highly developed long term plan for shaping global markets and opinions to
become more in line with Beijing’s policy priorities.12 This theme became more
11 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. "Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African Policy."
African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010)
12 Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's foreign aid activities
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Russia China and Eurasia-Social Historical and Cultural Issues
25, no. 2 (2009)
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prominent throughout the research. This then led the nature of Chinese government
intervention in FDI to fulfill foreign policy goals to become a cornerstone of this paper.
Kragelund’s paper on Chinese investments in Africa uses Zambia as a case study
the growth of Chinese private enterprise and investment in the vacuum of Western backed
economic development plans and private initiatives. While Zambia was not the focus of
this work the systems used by Chinese venture capitalists are very similar to those used
throughout the region, including Nigeria. The practical application of these methods is
important to the understanding of the increased importance of outside capital to develop
domestic African economies. There are gaps in information regarding other country’s
independent business models trying to accomplish the same thing and their success rate,
but overall it provided significant information on the private sector initiatives being
taken.13 Kragelund provided clear data needed to assess the findings put forth in this
paper. The use of multiple countries in his case study helped show the diversification of
those initiatives.
Within their article Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power discuss the differing
ideological constraints and methods used by Chinese and Western courses of investment
and aid. The authors have tried to avoid the pitfalls of assessing the morality of those
strategies and rather focused on comparing the impact of overall aid to economic
development and the development of the energy industries. The main case studies used
are the petroleum and coal sectors of Ghana and Angola using both Chinese and Western
aid packages. The overall conclusions rely on the concept that whether the outcome for
the African state in question is net-positive or net-negative, that both methods are in part
13 Kragelund, Peter. "Knocking on a wide-open door: Chinese investments in Africa." Review of African
Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009)
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coercive and that the donor country tends to hide the true motives of aid based economic
relations despite what ideological form they might subscribe to. It was refreshing to see
the “moral superiority” of Western aid practices called into question when much of the
analysis and work done on this subject tends to highlight the coercive and “deceptive”
nature of Chinese aid, while explaining away the improprieties of Western aid in the past
as a miscalculation of economic development goals.14 The distinction of one over the
other is inherently sloppy and disingenuous. This however comes into direct conflict with
Kolstad and his assessment of 29 African countries using Chinese FDI from 2003-2006.
Kolstad argues that rather than being more or less open to trade with any country across
the continent, that Chinese businesses go out of their way to look for opportunities which
give access to the highest number of resource rich areas in countries lacking developed
fair institutional controls. Thereby those actors involved make those areas of interest
prominent due to their exploitability rather than the fulfillment of long term strategic or
political goals.15
Several key terms will be used throughout this paper. When China is conducting
what is referred to here as “economic diplomacy” being defined as:
“…government service to the business community [and the state],
it means the overall aims of the development of socially beneficial
business ventures. It is the work of diplomatic missions in support of the
home county’s business and finance sectors and includes the promotion of
14 Tan‐Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power. "Redefining ‘aid’ in the China Africa
context." Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010)
15 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa."
Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011)
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inward and outward investment, as well as trade. Commercial diplomacy
consequently includes ‘all aspects of business support and promotion
(trade, investment, tourism, science, and technology, protection of
intellectual property)”16
The term Global South, “refers to the countries of the rest of the world, most of
which are located in the Southern Hemisphere which are included within medium to low
scales of human development, largely agrarian economies, generally lack in reliable civil
institutions or civic infrastructure”, such as Nigeria in this case.17
Investment, such as the Chinese industrial investment packages being applied
across the African continent, includes financial and technical assistance to the Nigerian
petroleum sector. Our primary concern is looking at the overall positive or negatives
changes between increased Chinese intervention and assistance, and its effect on China’s
market share of Nigerian oil.
The term predatory trade refers to the extractive nature of natural resources or
coercive control over key economic sectors. The donor nation is in a position to
manipulate their partner’s national assets, resources, and land in a way that benefits the
donor state. It may also damage or undermine the governing and economic integrity of
the recipient state. While both economic symbiosis and predatory trade are both extreme

16 Ruel, Huub. “Commercial Diplomacy in International Entrepreneurship: A Conceptual and Empirical
Exploration”. Emerald Group Publishing, (2012): Pg. 31

17 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: towards Theoretical
explanations." Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 4 (2008): Pg. 2
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terms, there will be a considerable amount of care given to distinguish between their
varied and inevitably complicated spectrum of shades of grey.18
The term economic (trade) symbiosis is defined as an interaction between two
different countries/states/groups living in close economic association and cooperation,
typically to the advantage of both in a spirit of beneficial mutual collaboration.19 That’s
what the previous literature says, but it’s missing a practical analysis of the workings of
Chinese foreign policy directives in conjunction with private enterprise. In addition, there
is a lack of information about the abilities our habits of government directly steering
private Chinese firms to a particular project, industry, region, or country. There are clear
roadmaps put forth in the literature previously discussed, but the aim of this paper is to
restructure that into a top-down look at the effect of government intervention in FDI and
its use as a foreign policy tool in Africa.

18 Sautman, Barry, and Yan Hairong. "Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa discourse." The
Asia-Pacific Journal 52, no. 3 (2009)

19 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa."
Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011): Pg. 34

17

3) The features of Chinese economic diplomacy
This section will discuss the history and modern application of Chinese economic
diplomacy. From the opening of Chinese markets in the past few decades, the original
economic reforms have taken the new form of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
New foreign policy goals and priorities for Beijing require the merging of these economic
and political powers.

a) The background of Chinese economic diplomacy
Chinese commercial diplomacy and extension of its soft power have been most
efficiently accomplished by the expansion of the Chinese consumer market and the
securing of raw materials. This has mainly been done through investment in those
countries which can both provide those materials but have a lack of domestic production.
The “peaceful rise of China” has at its heart a message of financial prosperity and
economic development throughout their growing relationships with other countries in the
world. Africa, for a variety of growth factors and resource wealth, is an excellent
platform to test the strategies and theories of Chinese business initiatives. China’s
approach to economic diplomacy has evolved from the original concepts brought forward
during the economic reforms of the 1990s, to the most recent global turmoil brought
about by the lasting effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The leadership in Beijing has
invested fulfil in developing the trade priorities of the PRC into one of the preeminent
trading powers in the world. The reforms continued by the succession of premierships
have directed China’s further integration into not only East Asia but the rest of the globe.
Beijing has been actively lobbying the international community and international
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organizations to modify common laws and trade practices to better met the short term
issues faced by Chinese industry, and the move to protect IP to develop and secure the
needed technological resources required for the future. The competitiveness of Chinese
goods, labor, and investments in the global marketplace are at the forefront of the
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ agendas. Due to the missteps of the
United States in the Middle East, and the fallout from the Great Recession, China has
found its desired role escalating at a significant rate the last decade. While increased trade
and development are of primary importance, the need for energy independence, or at the
very least, reliable sources of energy is a cornerstone of short and long term Chinese
military, diplomatic, and economic strategic planning. Economic growth and expansion is
essential for the security of the state.
Africa’s previous experience with development loans is decidedly mixed. The
Europeans, Americans, and IMF all have had mixed results with regard to African
sovereignty, debt obligations, and a lack of domestic collaboration. The scope of the
African debt crisis and the damage done by the actions of the inflexible lenders and
growth-stifling payments for past development loans, and the subsequent fallout of the
economic crisis, has caused FDI providers to reevaluate the way they do business. The
Nigerian-Chinese relationship has developed and evolved since relations were first
formally established in the 1970’s into, what is now, a key strategic and economic
partnership which has helped define China’s place as a global power. In addition it has
also helped define Nigeria’s place as a major economic and political leader on the African
continent. The relationship between Nigeria and China can in many ways been seen as a
model for economic symbiosis. Previous economic relationships have failed to generate
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successful growth and development in Africa. The reduction of Western assistance and
FDI from much of the African continent in the 1980’s, and the subsequent chaotic
political and economic environment in the 1990’s, had led many American and European
companies to go elsewhere to develop foreign markets and facilitate trade. It was in part
due to this “investment vacuum” that opened the door for Chinese development and
investment packages. These packages have been pushed forward by Chinese government
ministries and have drastically changed the nature of Chinese trade relations. It has also
made an astronomical impact in many African states, including Nigeria. This vacuum was
essential to the current wave of overseas investments being generated by Chinese
companies. China and much of Africa had not felt the range and depth of negative
economic effects experienced by the United States and other developed economies. The
mineral and energy sectors were subsequently lightly affected in Africa until the most
recent oil price drops.
The idea of a singular power making such inroads into the economic development
and resource access of an entire region has in the past represented something of a colonial
mindset. Chinese expansion into the Nigerian petroleum sector has rapidly increased the
engagement of Chinese capital investment and the need to build strategic partnerships
with these countries. Nigeria and China are becoming strong economic partners. There is
still concern however that this won’t create an equally beneficial relationship.
“China's increasing presence in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa,
has spurred much speculation about the nature of the emerging partnership
model. A national debate across sectors on this partnership will be a
healthy exercise and may drive more rigorous analysis of what best serves
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African countries' quest for human material advance; friendly, mutually
beneficial relations in trade and politics; and stewardship of the shared
heritage of the planet.”20
While many aspects of this partnership are not indicative of the relations between
other African states and China that does not mean that evaluating the positive effects and
potential pitfalls of those policies and their long term impacts on national and local
societies can’t be effectively applied other states in the future. Nigeria possesses a larger
and more educated population than most of the continent, in addition to a strong federal
system more capable of taking on the bureaucratic and systemic requirements to grow its
heavy industry in symbiosis with foreign investment.
“…the government of Shagari is noted to have assessed the IMF
financial facilities after approaching the institution on loan assessment
sometimes in 1983. Nigeria, under Shagari’s regime sought to borrow $2
billion from the fund, largely to help refinance, and had initiated
negotiation with IMF. However its trade debt then estimated to be between
$3 billion and $5 billion has not been serviced, and Nigeria was unwilling
to comply with IMF guidelines; therefore, his administration did not
succeed in getting the IMF loan (Biersteker, 1993). And by the period
Shagari left office in 1983, Nigeria was indebted to $14,130.7 million
(CBN Annual Report, 1988).”21
20 Nabine, D. "The impact of Chinese investment and trade on Nigeria economic growth." Pg. 1
21 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. Journal of Politics and Law, Pg. 6
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The repayment penalties inflicted on the country by their financiers in the
wake of this administrative meltdown further exacerbated the problems Nigeria
would experience for more than two decades after the original loans had been
called in. The cost of development may be corruption and economic dependency
on the part of the receiver country. This lesson was clearly learned by the
governments of central and southern Africa and their interactions with the new
Chinese forms of development loans have been shaped by these past exchanges.22
FDI is commonly used as a tool of foreign policy and in many ways political
coercion. This tactic is particularly useful in command-control economies and those
countries, such as China, where private enterprise of any size operates in direct
conjunction with the policies and whims of the central government. The strategic
placement of development loans and technical assistance provides a clear framework for
the motivations of long term Chinese development goals in the Global South. The
emerging regional and world powers are changing the world economic system to produce
more financially friendly results outside of the stock markets of New York, London, and
Tokyo. The ability for these countries to pick and choose their international expansion
with considerable financial resources and little historic or colonial baggage is an
invaluable asset in expanding economic ties and fiscal diversification. China must be
viewed not as an anomaly but as the harbinger of the “new normal” of international
investment.23 Despite China’s slowing economic growth rate, Chinese trade on the
22 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. Journal of Politics and Law, Pg. 2
23 Lengauer, Sara (2011) "China's foreign aid policy: Motive and method," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin
of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 3.
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African continent has expanded at a rapid pace; reaching a total value of US$170 billion
in 2013.24
“Statistics compiled by the Ministry of Commerce of China
suggest that outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows in the natural
resource sector on average accounted for 20.7% of total OFDI flows over
the period 2004-2009, and the average annual growth rate of OFDI flows
in this sector was 104.6% over the same period (MOFCOM, 2009).”25
The access of resources, such as oil, is strategically significant both in terms of
economic growth and reliability. The ability for MNEs and MNCs to act as a financial
go-between between states allows for some political protection against accusations of
giving one other country significant entry into a market of vital national importance.
MNCs insulate the both governments from requires in certain regional and bilateral
treaties which would otherwise have to be complied with. This system turns bilateral
relations into a business venture using corporations as a third party arbiter.
The petroleum industry in Nigeria accounts for 85% of the country’s export
revenue. As of 2014 the Nigerian pumping capacity can produce in excess of 2.2 million
barrels of crude oil per day; and it’s growing26 In addition, it is estimated that Nigeria and

24 Pigato, Miria, and Wenxia Tang. “China and Africa: Expanding economic ties in an evolving global
context.” World Bank, (2015): Pg. 2

25 Li, Jing, et al. "The Two‐Tier Bargaining Model Revisited: Theory and Evidence from China's Natural
Resource Investments in Africa." Global Strategy Journal 3.4 (2013): Pg. 3

26 Fantini, Alvino-Mario, ed. “OPEC – Annual Statistical Bulletin: 2014.” OPEC 6th International Seminar. Pg.
8

23

its surrounding coastline contains over 30% of all petroleum reserves on the African
continent, making it a powerhouse as an energy producer with massive untapped
potential.27 Like many other major oil producing countries, they are at serious risk of
falling into what is called in economics as the Dutch disease. This is the connection
between the increase in the economic development of certain natural resources and a
serious decline in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Oil, unfortunately, tends to make
countries resort to a severe type of resource dependency which can have catastrophic
economic consequences since the value of the country’s currency and economy is
invariably linked to the market strength of the commodity they possess. This leaves
Nigeria seriously susceptible to market forces outside of its own control, and while oil
wealth is spurring on many other sectors of development, it is still entirely too dominant a
force in the economy. Even the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce,
Industry, Mines and Agriculture’s (NACCIMA) Director-General Dr. John Isemede stated
that “the oil sector is creating distortion in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors
which are the main engines of an economy. This kills the economy silently.”28 Into this
fray entered Chinese investment and development companies such as PetroChina and
later on the CNOOC Group (China National Offshore Oil Corporation).29
“In December 2005, CNOOC bought a 45% stake in an offshore
Nigerian oil field for $2.27 billion, China’s largest foreign acquisition to
27 Downs, Erica Strecker. "The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations." Pg. 43
28 Adaramola, Zakariyya. “Nigeria: Naccima Says Oil Sector Is Killing Economy.” AllAfrica.
29 Frynas, Jedrzej George, and Manuel Paulo. "A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political, and
businessperspectives." African Affairs Pg. 231
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date, eclipsing Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo’s $1.75 billion
purchase of IBM’s personal computer business in 2004....And, as China
projects its commercial power abroad, strategic competition with US and
European interests is increasing.”30
With the rapid influx of capital and technological expertise from 1998- 2012, the
Nigeria petroleum industry rapidly grew until it has hit its current production point,
where it is now financing nearly the entire Nigerian government. In general West African
oil production in the last decade has grown at such a rate as to outstrip every other oil
producing region except the Middle East. The gradual takeover of the reins of petroleum
development from nationalized Nigerian companies will cause large sectors of Nigeria’s
main export and source of wealth to not only become susceptible to the will of the
market, but in many instances, be forced to bow to the will of Beijing.
“The most noteworthy point about Africa in China’s foreign aid is the
rising percentage of aid received by the continent. In the 2011 white paper,
aid to Africa in 2009 made up 45.7 percent of China’s total aid, while,
from 2010 to 2012 the share for Africa climbed to 51.8 percent. This 6.1
percentage point increase is the largest among all regions[…] Given the
overall volume of Chinese aid and Africa’s growing share, it is apparent
that Chinese aid to Africa has been on the rise. This trend forms a sharp
contrast to OECD countries’ decreasing bilateral aid to sub-Saharan

30 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. "A profile of the operations of Chinese multinationals in Africa." South
African journal of international affairs Pg. 91
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Africa, which dropped 7.9 percent in 2012 and another 4 percent in
2013”31
The Chinese investment firms and energy companies involved in these large scale
acquisitions have been formed out of larger Chinese government ministries for the
purpose of expanding their arm over key strategic resource areas. For the time being,
Nigeria’s highly sought after delta light sweet crude oil is the main point of interest for
most international investment in the country, and as companies and nations attempt to
outbid and outdo one another, it is to the Nigerian people’s advantage to exploit their
burgeoning relationship with the People’s Republic of China and the vast potential for
internal and external development their assistance can hold for the entire country.
Chinese Multi-National Corporations (MNC) have strategies and a series of
initiatives that have become repeated behaviors. One such behavior is to join existing
joint-ventures with companies who have “possible inroads into the political establishment
of countries with which it has only limited ties.”32 China’s energy dependency has
become the first and foremost priority of Beijing. Currently as the second largest energy
consumer and third largest importer, it’s dependent on fluctuating global markets. This is
a significant impediment to the role that China visualizes itself being in as a new global
power. “Until 1990, its principal suppliers were Indonesia, the sultanate of Oman, and
Iran. Extending the list of its suppliers has become imperative because of its increasing

31 Sun, Yan. "Africa in China’s New Foreign Aid White Paper." Africa in Focus, Brookings Online.
Washington D.C. (2014)

32 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. South African journal of international affairs Pg. 87
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domestic consumption and the depletion of Indonesian reserves.”33 As a matter of
consequence Africa has become a relatively uncontested area of Chinese participation in
energy development and extraction. Africa allows for the reduction of Chinese
dependency on energy supplies in unstable and unfriendly areas, while opening up further
access to 8.9% of global oil reserves. At present, China’s vulnerability in the energy
sector has been shrinking, even as overall economic growth has slowed, and in some
sectors, stagnated.
Another trend is the desire to acquire access to foreign energy assets and
resources, such as petroleum and coal deposits. Access to state capital for these projects is
a main driving motivation for Chinese MNCs to enter into certain energy rich markets as
opposed to others. In terms of overall trade finance, energy acquisition, and its related
investment, accounts for a substantive share of current Chinese investments. It will
continue to for some time.
“China’s emphasis on securing reliable sources of minerals in
Africa for its own economy is also reflected in its approach to vertical
integration and ownership of oil production facilities through to
transportation tankers. As a means of securing oil for Chinese consumers
below international market prices, instead of buying rights for future
exploration and development, Chinese enterprises have concentrated on
purchasing equity shares in established oil fields.”34

33 Lafargue, François. "China’s presence in Africa." China perspectives 61 (2005). Section 10
34 Whalley, John. “China’s Integration in the World Economy” World Scientific Publishing Company,
(2011): Pg. 247
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In dealing with the more extractive industries vertical integration has become an
effective tactic in facilitating further commercial control over these resources. Vertical or
backward integration is the expansion of commercial investment into assets which make
the most use out the particular desired resource. By acquiring the power plants or
refineries which the extracted resources are bound for, those companies can exert certain
controls over their price and market value. By further investing into these “upstream
assets” these MNCs can use their influence in the industries to acquire the raw materials
afterwards instead of doing so originally. This then acts as using a financial backdoor to
control the entire energy cycle of the resource in question.35

b) Increased trade and financial influence in Nigeria
The adaptable nature of African economies to the “new normal” of Asian
investment dollars on an unprecedented scale is shaping the commercial and industrial
markets of the region. Analysis of the weaknesses and discrepancies in Chinese
investment policy focus on the lack of strong civil society within China itself, making it
difficult to deal with these types of institutions abroad. “Chinese economic interests in
Nigeria can be broadly classified into two: private and public. Information from the
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) revealed that Chinese private FDI
are mostly in agro-allied industry, manufacturing and communications sectors.”36 The
growth of GONGOs (government organized NGOs) fill in the gaps that investment policy
35 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. Pg. 86
36 Oyeranti, Olugboyega A., et al. "The impact of China-Africa investment relations: the case of Nigeria."
AERC Collaborative Research China-Africa Project Policy Brief 8.6 (2010)
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has had to deal with in the past. Free from many of the institutional memories of past
imperialism, China views itself and indeed projects itself, as a beneficial older brother
coming to the aid of a former colonial possession and in support of development across
all sectors of the economy and society.37 While this assessment is perhaps too benevolent,
it would be too simple to view China’s actions as purely predatory. In fact the close
partnership and ties between Abuja and Beijing have been a major catalyst for the rise in
Nigerian GDP, and its increased share of the global marketplace. While many of its
citizens have not shared in the benefits brought by Chinese investment and development
projects, whether due to design or corruption, it still has caused an escalation of industrial
capabilities and agricultural output. Through Chinese investments and cooperative efforts
with Nigerian companies, industry, and government the petroleum sector is booming.
While this comes with a host of connected benefits and problems, at least in the short
term it can give Nigeria a serious boost to develop a 21st century economy.
The impact of foreign aid and technical assistance on growth and the effectiveness
of technical versus non-technical assistance within foreign aid use empirical data to
analyze aid as a fraction of GDP and institutional development levels. They come to the
conclusion that when presented with a theoretical growth model for small open
economies (such as Nigeria and Kenya) the biggest impact made by TA and NTA is the
ability to reduce income disparities within the state, particularly when referring to TA
(technical assistance) in a fairly well administered locality.38
37 Alden, Chris, and Daniel Large. "China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering difference in
Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 20.68 (2011): Pg. 21

38 Annen, Kurt, and Stephen Kosempel. "Foreign Aid, Donor Fragmentation, and Economic
Growth." The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 9, no. 1 (2009)
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c) The political elements behind commercial diplomacy
The difference between the promotion of foreign loans from large economic
powers versus assistance from smaller economies in the facilitation of economic reform
is the amount of influence gained over the receiving country. In the wake of the Cold
War, global market powers pursued their strategic interests at the expense of local
development needs. For example, the US invested in petroleum and heavy industry,
which did little to generate growth or aid the local population.
“Integral to any such approach, however, will be the expectation
that – owing to weak state institutions, high incidence of conflict and
relative economic fragility of most African countries – developments in
Africa, independent of U.S.-China relations, will repeatedly test U.S. and
Chinese approaches and their resolve to work collaboratively. It will be no
less important to anticipate that enduring philosophical, ideological and
programmatic differences, mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, and
competitive tensions will sustain the risk of a clash of U.S.-China interests
in Africa. Hence the special need to anticipate flash points in approaches
to Africa and manage them preemptively: most importantly, at this point,
are crises such as Darfur, sensitive assistance issues such as debt and
harmonization of donor approaches, and access to energy resources.”39

39 Gill, Bates, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. "Assessing China’s growing influence in Africa."
China Security 3.3 (2007): Pg. 17.
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This assessment attempts to prove the strategic and growth benefits of
development loans are more closely associated with inter-regional assistance, and its
ability to promote more positive economic changes and inclusion. This establishes a
series of situational occurrences questioning the usefulness and positive impact of large
donor states such as China to smaller developing economies. China has dealt the
international order a blow by scaling up investment throughout the African continent at
the same time as the European Union and the United States are reducing aid, investment,
and assistance programs. The resultant actions may lead to another “scramble for Africa”
between the major powers, with one of the many beneficiaries being the higher place
these states will have in future international forum and organizations.40
Using ASEAN, NAFTA, and the SCO as preliminaries for FDI packages and
investment groups, China has been able to successfully adapt models of inter-Asian
development for use on the African continent, even embracing the US Dollar and Euro as
a means of fiscal inclusion toward these emerging economies. The transitory nature and
development of Chinese FDI and development loan structures versus Western versions of
it, allows for a certain flexibility to deal with regulatory bodies and oversight from IOs
and other regional organizations. This would help avoiding certain situations such as the
case of copper mining in Zambia. The focus on the extractive nature of Chinese industrial
investment has made that local communities and domestic political structures in the
potential opposition of being usurped and/or sidestepped in order to undermine its
authority over those Chinese projects.

40 Campbell, Horace. "China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony." Third World Quarterly: 29, no. 1
(2008): Pg. 104
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The practices of Chinese large-scale investments, the use of GONGOs
(government organized NGOs), and third party companies to facilitate state-financed
assistance, is often outside of the prying eyes of the international community. The lack of
transparency of many Chinese investment projects, particularly concerning raw materials
and heavy industry is used to develop a rubric to overcome the challenges of effectively
monitoring Chinese economic practices. This paper helps establish guidelines to
understanding Chinese industrial investment and its potential consequences to the
political and legal authority over the future development of Zambia’s natural resource
wealth. The lessons learned and strategies established in it will become helpful when
defining the potential pitfalls of invest and correcting those issue; at least in public
perception.41

4) The Nigerian petroleum industry
a) History of Chinese assistance
The People’s Republic of China has emerged rapidly recent years. Historically,
China has infrequently concerned itself with affairs and dealings outside of its borders (or
41 Haglund, Dan. "Regulating FDI in weak African states: a case study of Chinese copper mining in
Zambia." The journal of modern African studies 46, no. 04 (2008): Pg. 547
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region). Due in part to the globalization of markets, advanced communications, and an
unstable world-order, China has gone beyond its normal spheres of influence, becoming
involved in global trade, foreign aid, and military might.
“The major beneficiaries of the Chinese boom have been Angola
and Sudan. Angola, currently Africa’s second largest oil producer after
Nigeria, is China’s top supplier, providing more than 400,000 barrels per
day, or close to 15 percent of China’s oil imports, comparable to U.S. oil
imports from Angola. Plagued by decades of war, burdened by
reconstruction costs, and castigated by international development
institutions for lack of transparency in oil revenue management, the
Angolans have welcomed China’s interest. In return for concessions and
oil contracts, the Chinese are providing financial incentives. A $2 billion
line of credit (1.5 percent interest over 17 years) by the EximBank of
China has helped finance vital infrastructure in this post-conflict economy,
and an additional $2 billion loan was granted in 2006.”42
As the world’s largest manufacturer, importer, and exporter, China was eventually
poised to move into new and emerging markets, particularly in the Global South. Political
and economic expansion into Africa has proved to be to the development of 21st century
China what westward expansion and Manifest Destiny was to the development of 19th
century America. Not only are new opportunities being created everyday across every
industry, but the effect of an economic Wild West on Chinese venture capitalism and

42 Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade,
investment, and aid links." The World Bank Research Observer 22.1 (2007): Pg. 119
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industrial behavior will help propel a new philosophy of investment in stark contrast to
the conservative actions and motivations of the past. Furthermore, the benefits and
dividends produced by this practice of developing wide ranged, multifaceted bilateral
relationships has intrinsically altered the Chinese government’s approach to foreign
relations, and particularly its newfound aggressive approach to its foreign policy toward
the Global South.
Central Africa is at the apex of entering an upward economic and political
trajectory from a forgotten colonial ruin into a series of key international players in the
decades to come. “In what concerns the oil sector China has made major investments
(upstream and downstream – refineries and pipelines) not only in other established major
oil producers such as Sudan (since 1998) and more recently in Nigeria, but also in
smaller producing states (Gabon, Congo-B) and new producers (Equatorial Guinea,
Chad).”43 The great strides China was made in the world economic system and its
burgeoning trade and cultural relationships with the Global South will be essential to
recognizing and comprehending the development of the Chinese government’s mindset
with respect to understanding its current and future foreign policy positions.
“In essence, Africa is primarily as source of crude materials and
also a market for Chinese finished goods. For example, Sudan is a major
oil supplier to China, currently accounting for 7.7% of Chinese total oil
imports. Also, China has become the third major purchaser of oil from
Gabon, after the United States and France, and trade relations between the
43 Alden, Chris, and Ana Cristina Alves. “China and Africa's natural resources: The challenges and
implications for development and governance.” Johannesburg: South African Institute of International
Affairs, (2009): Pg. 16
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two countries are expanding. For example, over 60% of Gabon’s timber is
exported to Asia, mainly to China.”44
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has actively been seeking
further Chinese investments make the Nigerian natural gas sector as modern and efficient
as the domestic petroleum industry. The desire is to generate and attract $50 billion USD
to improve and expand infrastructure development. 38 Chinese companies were involved
in the agreements, including Sinopec. Nigeria requires investment to expanded non-petrol
fuel and power production. Despite a large amount of natural energy wealth, refineries
and natural gas plants have become increasingly overworked and underserviced. The
expansion of these sectors cannot move forward without fixing the issues already
plaguing them.

b) Effects of Nigerian production and market share
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is among the most populous countries in the
world and currently boasts the largest economy in Africa. A geographically large and
diverse state, its economic success is based on strong petroleum exports and a diverse
collection of other industries such as agriculture/cattle, manufacturing, and
telecommunications. “The extractive sector in the Nigerian economy is large and
extensive, with oil playing a dominant role. With nearly 37.2 billion barrels in reserve
and 2.13% of global production, Nigeria has the world’s tenth largest proven reserves
(3.1% of global reserves), and is among the top 10 oil producers.”45 Its geographical
44 Ajakaiye, Olu. “China and Africa: opportunities and challenges.” AERC Scoping Studies on China-Africa
Economic Relations, (2006): Pg. 5

45 Akinlo, Anthony Enisan. "How important is oil in Nigeria’s economic growth?." Journal of Sustainable
Development 5.4 (2012): Pg. 167
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location on the Gulf of Guinea not only gives it direct access over some of the world’s
largest untapped oil deposits, but also convenient and natural trade links with South
America and Europe.
At the same time as Nigeria’s economic growth accelerated, the People’s Republic
of China began a major foreign policy and trade shift toward cooperation, regional
development, and investment on the African continent. The traditional ties of Africa’s
communities and governing bodies are taking a backseat to the larger macroeconomic
forces requiring a large scale revamp of central banking and industrial development in
conjunction with increasing lucrative trade partnerships between state controlled African
resources, such as Nigeria’s basin oil, and the evolution of Chinese MNCs and venture
capital. . “Oil is the fiscal basis for the Nigerian state, accounting for over 90% of export
earnings and 80% of federal revenues. Perhaps the most contentious role of the Nigerian
state relates to the distribution of oil revenues in a multi-ethnic, but highly centralized
federation. At its heart in the feeling that oil wealth from the Niger Delta is controlled by
ethnic-majority ruling elites from other, non-oil producing parts of the country, which
dominate the federal government, while the ethnic minorities in the region that produces
the oil – the “goose that lays the golden eggs” – suffer from neglect, pollution, and
underdevelopment.”46 There is a vulnerability to become addicted, so to speak, to Chinese
imports and hard currency. The trade imbalance currently shows that for every dollar
coming into Nigerian central banks due to exports to China; three dollars are being spent

46 Obi, Cyril I. "Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta."
Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement 30.1-2 (2010):
Pg. 223
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importing goods from China.47 The imbalance is only growing from almost two decades
of increasing reliance on the East Asia trade cycles.

c) Public perception
The Chinese relationship with Central Africa is among the most important
economic, political, and developing partnerships in current international relations. Shared
interests and economic gains have flourished in a security collaboration and cultural
exchange program unlike most others seen between other major world powers and Africa.
“China puts a lot of importance to good relations with African
political elite, which in respect holds generally positive views of
China. This however opens up space for political opposition which
might try to capitalize an anti-Chinese agenda. When looking at how
different parts of society organize in reaction to China, the effect of unions
is remarkable. In countries where unions are traditionally strong and
represent a large part of the population, they can bargain better
conditions for their members. This is another way of saying that Chinese
companies bring in Chinese workers and pay low wages to locals
whenever the legal situation allows it while it complies with them when
law and enforcement mechanisms are in place.”48

47 Agubamah, Edgar. "Bilateral relations: periscoping Nigeria and China relations." European Scientific
Journal 10.14 (2014): Pg. 67

48 Rebol, Max. "Public perceptions and reactions: Gauging African views of China in Africa." Alternatives:
Turkish Journal of International Relations 9.4 (2010): Pg. 160.
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In fact the close partnership and ties between Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and
China has been a major catalyst for the rise in those countries’ GDP, and their increased
share of the global marketplace.”
A report prepared for the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
analyzed the use and impact of Chinese aid to Africa in terms of health. The health sector
includes the building of a healthcare infrastructure, the training of doctors and nurses, the
use of medicines and materials, the use of Chinese medical personnel, the promotion of
better nutrition and pilot programs designed to incorporate both American and Chinese
health development projects within several African states. As a result of past experiences
by other countries China has built a model in which “free aid’ was replaced with a policy
of economic aid which functions to provide “equality, reciprocity, effectiveness, and
diversity.” While much of the focus of the report is on American-Chinese relations in
African health aid, the data on the methodology of Chinese aid, its terminology and
thought-process, and the transition to the status as predominant donor.49
The concepts of the promotion African “ownership” over its development and
capital investment programs are based largely on the fairly accurate assumption of the
inherent corrupt nature of local regimes, lax regulatory environments and extractive
industrial practices. The scope of the hurdles facing FDI in Africa needs to be reassessed
to deal with the realities and possibly reforms on the ground are varied and excessive.
Development without constraints sometimes leads to a regressive economic climate.
“Comparing the country experiences, it points out the conditions accounting for the

49 Freeman, Charles, and Xiaoqing Lu Boynton. "China’s Emerging Global Health and
Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011).
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varying success of eight African countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia. It concludes by asking whether the
conditions African countries face in further loan negotiations are changing.”50 Defining
new investments on the terms and conditions of strategies on the part of donor states will
promote reformed economic habits and institutions on the part of African states post-IMF
debt crisis. Understanding the new normal with reference to Chinese industrial
investment and development loans will lead to a better understanding and mapping of the
broader strategies and tactics involved in the planning, facilitation, and execution of
intentional financial investment and its effect on the growth of Africa GDP.51
In order to counteract some of the major trade imbalance Nigeria adopted an act
which provided for the domestic inclusion in the development of the Nigerian oil and gas
industry: The Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, known also
as the “Local Content Act” sought to grow the local economy by spreading the petroleum
jobs to otherwise underserved groups and reduced the demand for foreign workers and
other extractive elements in the industry. While not specifically aimed at increased
Chinese influence over that industry, the law was meant to alleviate some of the
regionalism plaguing the sentiments of those living in oil rich areas that hadn’t properly
benefited from its contribution to the growing economy.
The Act originates from the “Nigerian Content Policy” which sought to increase
Nigerian domestic participation in the main sector of economy growth while training
citizens in the jobs necessary to run the sector efficiently, and safely. The promotion of
50 Whitfield, Lindsay, ed. “The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors:
African Strategies for Dealing with Donors.” Oxford University Press, (2008)

51 Whitfield, Lindsay, ed., Oxford University Press, (2008)
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local workers utilizing local resources to create circular wealth generation has also
expanded to other aspects of Nigerian heavy industry. Among the provisions in the act
were that fair bids by Nigerian companies be given primary consideration when
developing new petrol-infrastructure. In order to be considered a Nigerian company 51%
of the equity must be owned by Nigerians. Permits would be granted to Nigerian
companies; preferentially. Only 5% of all managerial positions could be held by expats. A
minimum of 10% of the generated revenue must be held in Nigerian banks, and a
framework be put in place for the reduction of taxes for those companies building or
expanding facilities directly related to the industry.52
“All regulatory authorities, operators, contractors, subcontractors,
alliance partners and other entities involved in any project, operation,
activity or transaction in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are required to
consider Nigerian content as an important element of their projects.
Nigerian independent operators shall be given priority in the award of oil
blocks, oil field and oil lifting licenses as well as in all projects for which
contracts are to be awarded in the Nigerian petroleum industry subject to
the fulfilment of conditions specified by the Minister of Petroleum
Resources.”53
In the current era of rapid globalization across every sector and facet of the human
experience, it is commerce and trade which drive progress and the will of states to engage
52 Atsegbua, Lawrence Asekome. "The Nigerian oil and gas industry content development act 2010: An
examination of its regulatory framework." OPEC Energy Review 36.4 (2012): Pg 480

53 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%202016/Nigerian%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Industry
%20Content%20Development%20Act%202010.pdf
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in peaceful cooperation instead of aggressive coercion. No longer can empires colonialize
and exploit conquered populations at will, though in some cases it may happen more
quietly and insidiously. It is the global marketplace that is bringing states together that
would never interact with each other under the rules of past eras. Understanding the
goals, priorities, actions, and thought process of Chinese foreign policy is essential for
every other world power if they desire to remain relevant, successful, and active in global
trade and politics. The Chinese-African partnership appears to be a long term and
mutually beneficial foreign policy on the part of both countries. This relationship should
be closely studied by the Western economies to learn from the successes and pitfalls of
the “Chinese way” of conducting intercontinental commerce and market expansion.
Sometimes it takes an outside and fresh angle to put the greater goals and ambitions of
global leaders and emerging economies into perspective.

5) Chinese advances into Africa strategic and commercial mining sectors
In this section I will explain the resource needs and situation of China and how it
impacts the size and shape of their economic international with the desired country.
Furthermore, the Chinese interaction with various regional and international
organizations will be explained in the context of how it affects business practices, reform
of past errors and future development plans for the African continent.

a) Overall assessment of minerals, locations, and controlling interests
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The dominant motives behind China's increasing financial presence in Africa in
the last decade based on empirical quantitative evidence on Chinese outward foreign
direct investment across 29 African countries from the period 2003–2006 was created to
examine and to assign priorities within different economic and development sectors.
“Chinese ministry of commerce summarized the main aim of
government policy towards Nigeria into three (3) points they are as
follows: (i) to increase Chinese Multinational Companies in the Nigerian
market share. (ii) To expand the Nigerian market for Chinese
manufactured goods. (iii) To increase China’s presence in Nigeria oil and
gas sector and leverage its investment in Nigeria as a gateway for entering
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) market.”54
This concludes that Chinese FDI is heavily influenced by the presence of largescale raw materials within its invest opportunities of choice and that the more lax the
environmental and government protections over industry, the more likely Chinese third
party companies will set up shop and begin to build its industrial capacities there. The
need for raw materials, the need for strategic and lucrative resource access has prompted
Chinese intervention on an economic scale that rivals the Marshal Plan. The contention in
this work can be used to assess the international reactions to Chinese capital injections
into the industrial and mining sectors of the Zambian economy and the long term
potential effects of aid and investment dependency due to a lake of controls on
construction waste disposal and local participation in that particular economic sector. The

54 Izuchukwu, Oji-Okoro, and Daniel Ofori. "Why south-south fdi is booming: case study of china fdi in
nigeria." Asian Economic and Financial Review 4.3 (2014): Pg. 362
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needs of the industrial capacity of Chinese companies and their ability to redirect that
capital are also cause for concern among more established Western donor states.55
There is acknowledgment that this type of priority assessment becomes
“problematic in terms of development impact, as Chinese investment feeds into the
institutional dysfunctions of resource-rich countries.”56 The realities of Chinese FDI are
in essence the same as those of Western investment; namely the ability to gain access to
these industrial rich materials in the least expensive way exploiting institutional and
localized corruption and lax regulation for increased profits.

b) Largest continental partners and local public perception of Chinese inclusion
The historical development of China’s advocacy of the “principle of
noninterference” in wider African foreign policy finds that in spite of China’s consistent
vocal support for noninterference over the past decades, the significance of the principle
in shaping Beijing’s foreign policy decisions has varied as its pragmatic interests have
shifted toward becoming a global leader.
“China’s current emphasis on the doctrine of noninterference is shaped by
its perceived strategic self-interests. Engaging African states without
prejudice to their domestic policies or political composition and honoring
their right to noninterference facilitates important economic objectives,
such as acquiring the raw materials and energy supplies required to fuel
55 Kragelund, Peter. "Knocking on a wide-open door: Chinese investments in Africa." Review
of African Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009): Pg. 481

56 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct
investment in Africa." Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011): Pg. 37
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China’s rapid economic growth, opening markets to its abundant
manufactured exports and providing its companies with investment
opportunities.”57
The need for new markets to expand China’s export-heavy economy and the
expansion of access to raw materials for Chinese production has led to the natural
conclusion that overall invest and development has to be increased further. Beijing has
found limiting its actions though the scope of its philosophical approach toward
noninterference is less than realistic and as “recurrences of regional instability and antiChinese populism have threatened its interests, citizens, and assets on the continent, will
likely take a more forceful role in its relations with partner states.” This will establish
guidelines for the transition of Chinese political philosophy in dealing with the global
south and meeting its economic realities with regard to market expansion and resource
extraction.58 “In September 2011, Michael Sata won Zambia's presidency largely by
tapping into anti-Chinese resentments after Chinese managers shot protesters at a large
coal mine in southern Zambia one year prior. In 2013, Lamido Sanusi, governor of the
Central Bank of Nigeria, compared China’s presence on the continent to “a new form of
imperialism.”59 Nigerians brought petitions to their local and central governments
cataloging their objections to the labor conditions in Chinese owned factories. Nigeria’s
trade unions have subsequently joined in the lobbying for increased accountability and
57 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. "Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African
Policy." African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): Pg. 365

58 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. (2010): Pg. 359
59 Alessi, Christopher, and Beina Xu. "China in Africa." Council on Foreign Relations. (2016)
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the establishment of economic safeguards they feel are required due to the loss of small
scale manufacturing jobs due to the massive increase in cheaper Chinese imports. And
due to the lack of will to update and expand tax collections when imported goods come
across the large boarder, the income generated by tariffs and importation taxes doesn’t
find itself going into the government’s coffers. China is seen as a partner to Africa, but
also as a competitor. The need for FDI and development assistance outweighs the
domestic ideological or political concerns over the continued expanded role China has in
Nigeria, and specifically its energy producing sectors. Leaders in conjunction with the
African Development Bank have supported Nigeria’s Central Bank taking on a more
“activist role”, providing refinancing to banks exposed to defaulted loans by small
manufactures and those companies suffering from debilitating inflated repayments. While
some accuse China of “predatory” trade practices, the short and long term development
of the region, if properly managed will create stronger independent markets with
beneficial ties to Beijing and each other.
Within Chinese forging policy in regard to development loans in the Global
South, the use of different strategies when dealing with various types of governments,
political units, and ethnic groups provides an excellent series of case studies to evaluate
short and long term Chinese political goals. ASEAN interrelations helped develop and
form the current FDI loan policies being spread by Beijing within the African continent.
The historic and current evolution of these policies can act as predictors for future
behaviors within investment, development packages, and wider bilateral industrial
projects. The conceptualization of the evolution of Chinese development projects will
help establish a set of guidelines and build a framework to better understand and explain
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the political nature of this type of economic interaction. This framework can produce a
clear line from third party development projects back to the main foreign policy outreach
and analysis of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing.60

c) Future developments within Africa
The fear and criticism of Chinese large-scale industrial and development
investment in Africa is built on a well-founded belief that China actively undermines the
sovereign authority of host governments in economically untapped and underutilized
local economies. The debates surrounding this economic ascendency come with certain
prejudices. Their goal is to also call out many western analysts who routinely “ignore the
longer term motivations and modalities of Chinese aid and the historical diversity of
Chinese relations with Africa, but also uncritically assumes ‘Western’ aid to be morally
‘better’ and ‘more effective’ in terms of development outcomes.” The broader trends are
just not that simple, and Beijing is probably not that shortsighted with an aim toward
further economic expansion and financial integration of new markets. Secondary
elements of this paper compare and contrast the approaches to dual case studies within
the use of FDI in Ghana and Angola. This builds a structure to chart historic trends in the
expansion and maintenance of large advanced development infrastructure. The primary
argument focused on comparing the different governing and ideological practices are
used by both the Chinese and the west in their manipulations of Africa’s inherent
weaknesses and corruption. While this will not specifically cover western FDI practices,
60 Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's foreign aid activities
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Russia China and Eurasia-Social Historical and Cultural Issues
25, no. 2 (2009): Pg. 175
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the development of capital dependency has at its root a commonality in western financial
practices.61

6) Conclusions

61 Tan‐Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power. "Redefining ‘aid’ in the China Africa
context." Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010): Pg. 860
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The nature of hegemonic led financial relationships tends to settle within
the grey area between exploitive and benevolent patronage. While the countries in
question overwhelmingly depend on their agricultural sectors for the bulk of their GDP,
and technical assistance afforded them in their bilateral relations with the Chinese
government, its sponsored corporations and affiliates, has been a sincere net-positive for
those countries’ agricultural development. In the mining and transportation sectors, the
strength of Chinese pressure to control and guide domestic African industries, coupled
with the slow but steady control over the nature of industrial finance, has created a
situation where, while the African states in question are clearly benefiting from the
changes and investment. The petroleum industry represents the main goal for Chinese
FDI to expand and control. The increase in their influence over the extraction, refinement
and transportation of this vital strategic natural resource is fueling the domestic Chinese
economy, as well as increasing its energy independence. The time and effort made to
expand Chinese bilateral relations in the region and the use of commercial diplomacy are
helping to ensure Chinese dominance in the world of African oil. The fear of ‘Dutch
disease’ and the use of trade as purely a coercive tactic aren’t out of the realm of
possibility, but there is much to be gained by mutual cooperation and it looks as if the
benefits of intimately linking the energy sectors far outweigh the potential dangers. The
ability for China to use this policy of noninterference to expand relationships to states
hesitant to take on foreign partners is at the forefront of Beijing’s diplomatic overtures.
Many of these states are less concerned with Chinese working conditions, the diplomatic
stance of Taiwan, and environmental protection than they are of developed countries
exploiting them for material gain. By advocating for a political hands-off approach China
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has won over many emerging economies and dozens of smaller allies. This in turn
translates to an increase in secured access to the economic resources and domestic
markets of those states. The expansion of Sino-African relations is vital to the long term
economic ambitions of Beijing.
The short term gains are being spread throughout only a small powerful segment
of the population, and there is clear possibility of serious exploitation and loss of
sovereignty to third party Chinese companies. The investment of long term capital,
equipment, technical personnel and industrial manpower, set the stage for an insidious
economic takeover for the most strategic and valuable industries these African states
possess. The short term capital saturation in the form of lucrative loans or the leasing of
heavy equipment has helped define the immediate corporate actors. The readied access of
on-the-ground technical expertise has allowed Chinese companies to adopt positions of
political and strategic advantage.
The concept of the effect of FDI on African business and social culture wasn’t
covered within the framework of this paper, but it’s a topic that should be given more
focus and discussion. It would be a fascinating follow-up piece alongside the changes
undergone by the evolving nature of Chinese economic diplomacy. The access to and
increased refinement of the major African deposits of raw materials will represent a larger
controlling share of those assets due to other dwindling supplies around the world. The
components and mechanisms fueling our current technological revolution depend on
those industries and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The Chinese
corporate system acting in accordance with Beijing’s style of economic diplomacy is
building bridges across continents to combine markets in an unequaled way. Nigeria is
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one of dozens of countries in Central Africa with an effective economic and political
relationship with Beijing, but due to its centralized state, and developed industrial base, it
is the ideal operating ground for ever expanding Chinese economic ventures in Africa and
throughout the Global South.
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